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The 2013-2014 term for the Supreme Court of Canada began in the 
normal course. It included the appointment of a new judge: Marc Nadon. 
Six months later, in the Supreme Court Act Reference,1 the Court ruled 
both that the appointment was void ab initio; and that the Court is an 
entrenched constitutional actor beyond the scope of statutory changes. 
By any measure, the Reference was an exceptional moment. In this 
article, I explain why.2 
The Reference was influenced by complex and interlocking factors. 
It concerned judicial appointments, over which the Prime Minister enjoys 
tremendous discretionary power. It also was a case of first impression. 
The Constitution Act, 18673 has nothing to say about the Supreme Court, 
and sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act4 had never before been 
interpreted. The relationship between the Stephen Harper government 
                                                                                                                       
*  Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. With thanks to Tim Sullivan for research assistance, 
Michael Plaxton for extensive discussion and feedback and anonymous reviewers for helpful 
comments. 
1  Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 433, 
2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference” or “Supreme Court Act Reference”]. 
2  My view of the substantive legal question was first articulated in a 2013 article: Michael 
Plaxton & Carissima Mathen, “Purposive Interpretation, Quebec, and the Supreme Court Act” (2013) 
22:3 Constitutional Forum 15 [hereinafter “Plaxton & Mathen”]. I also appeared before committees of 
the Canadian House of Commons and Senate: Appearances on November 19 and 21, 2013 on 
Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2 (Bill C-4), S.C. 2013, c. 40 [hereinafter “Economic Action Plan 
2013 Act”], ss. 471, 472. 
3  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 96, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, 
No. 5 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”]. 
4  Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4(1) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Act”]. 
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and the Court had long been tense. Perhaps as a result, the government 
decided to initiate a reference and pass declaratory legislation at the same 
time. As discussed in Part II, all of these elements created a perfect storm 
of law and politics.  
In considering the Reference, the Court met several dilemmas. One 
of the sitting judges faced concerns about bias.5 The Court confronted the 
awkward task of considering the eligibility of a sitting member. And, it 
was required to interrogate its own status under the Constitution.6 These 
dilemmas are discussed in Part III. 
The Court’s interpretation of section 6, delivered in a 6-1 ruling 
wherein the majority found Nadon J. ineligible, was met with a great deal 
of skepticism. In Part IV, I evaluate, and ultimately reject, two of the 
most common criticisms of the majority’s reasoning: that it is absurd, 
and that it produces unintended, and highly undesirable, consequences.7  
Finally, in Part V, I consider the reaction to the Reference. Even for a 
Court that routinely issues controversial decisions, the Reference provoked 
an unusually intense response. I discuss how the Reference engaged the 
expectation that the Court will provide a “right answer” and, flowing from 
that, I offer three reasons that the Reference provoked the reaction that it did.  
II. A PERFECT STORM 
In order to understand any constitutional issue, one must appreciate 
its broader context. The Reference is an excellent illustration. First, the 
Reference concerned a Supreme Court appointment, a matter that since 
                                                                                                                       
5  In this article, I deal with the recusal by Marshall Rothstein J. After the Reference, it was 
suggested that the Chief Justice herself should not have participated because (a) she had sworn in 
Nadon J. and (b) she was alleged to have improperly interfered in the process. Infra, note 23. The first 
claim is interesting but for space reasons cannot be examined here. Briefly, though, it seems to me that 
the Chief Justice’s administrative and adjudicative roles are legitimately separate, and her ability to 
preside over the matter was no more vulnerable than those of her sitting colleagues, in that all 
welcomed Nadon J. as their newest member. I consider the second allegation to be baseless, and I 
address it in Part V. I note that the government, which would have been in possession of all of the facts 
available to support the second allegation, made no mention of it during the hearing and was content to 
proceed with the hearing (in a reference it initiated) before the Chief Justice. 
6  The Court ruled that its composition and essential features (set forth in ss. 5 and 6 of the 
Supreme Court Act) are now protected against most kinds of change except by formal amendment 
under Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,  
c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1982”]. 
7  Both of these arguments relate to the s. 6 issue. I do not address in detail the Court’s analysis 
of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982. Further discussion may be found in my chapter “The Federal 
Principle: Constitutional Amendment and Intergovernmental Relations”, in Emmett MacFarlane, ed., 
Constitutional Amendment in Canada (UTP, forthcoming). 
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1875 has been in the exclusive purview of the Prime Minister (aided by 
the Minister of Justice).8 The process for all federal judicial 
appointments, including to the Court, has long been criticized.9 In the 
mid-2000s, the process underwent some changes, but none touched the 
executive discretion at its core. The most dramatic development was in 
2005, when a Supreme Court candidate appeared before members of 
Parliament to answer questions. For 10 years, such hearings became 
regular occurrences.10 Though the process continued to attract criticism, 
the prospects of forcing change were remote. And no court had ever been 
asked to pronounce on either the process or a particular appointment. 
In 2013, Morris Fish J. announced his retirement. As Fish J. was 
from Quebec, his replacement would also have to hail from that 
province. The Prime Minister selected a supernumerary judge, Marc 
Nadon, from the Federal Court of Appeal. Justice Nadon had a particular 
expertise in maritime law, a field that rarely occupies the Supreme 
Court’s docket.11 His record included such things as a dissent in a 
Federal Court decision ordering the Canadian government to seek the 
                                                                                                                       
8  While s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 authorizes Parliament to provide for a “General 
Court of Appeal for Canada” the appointment process is vested in the Executive through s. 4 of the 
Supreme Court Act. 
9  The Constitution Act, 1867 contains very little on the subject. Section 96 states merely: “The 
Governor General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior, District, and County Courts in each 
Province.” The appointment power for those courts is followed by very brief criteria for selection, and 
some basic guarantees of tenure. Section 92(14) grants the provinces jurisdiction over, “[t]he 
Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance and Organization of 
Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters 
in those Courts.” Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 3, ss. 96-100. 
10  The first to undergo the process was Justice Marshall Rothstein. It was repeated with 
Moldaver J. and Karakatsanis J. in 2011 and Wagner J. in 2012. Justice Thomas Cromwell, appointed in 
February 2009, did not appear before a committee largely because of the December 2008 prorogation of 
Parliament. After the Reference was issued in April 2014, the candidate short list was leaked to a 
national newspaper. Declaring the process compromised, the federal government returned to the older 
model of simply making the appointment with no hearing. Two justices have since been appointed in 
this way: Clement Gascon and Suzanne Côté. 
11  In repeating these characterizations of Nadon J., I do not mean to denigrate his expertise or 
experience. During his two decades on the bench, Nadon J. presided over numerous legal matters. The 
federal government itself highlighted Nadon’s maritime law expertise, online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/ 
2013/10/03/pm-announces-appointment-justice-marc-nadon-supreme-court-canada>, and it has become a 
standard descriptor of him. The status of being supernumerary is perhaps of greater concern in that it is a 
step just prior to taking retirement. Both Nadon J. and the government said that the status permitted him to 
sit on more complex cases, but critics did raise a concern about the shift in workload that a move to the 
Supreme Court of Canada would entail. Jeffrey Simpson, “The Supreme Court deserves better”, The Globe 
and Mail, October 26, 2013, online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-supreme-court-
deserves-better/article15027360/>. 
164 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
repatriation of Omar Khadr, indicating, to some, a conservative mindset.12 
It was also suggested that the choice reflected a decided preference for 
federal courts jurists over those from the Quebec Court of Appeal.13  
There is no question that Nadon J., a jurist of some two decades with 
extensive private practice experience, was qualified to sit on the Supreme 
Court.14 True, he was not the most obvious choice. But, narrow conceptions 
of “the best” candidate should be avoided.15 There are many paths to 
judicial excellence, and predictions of greatness are notoriously unreliable.  
Almost immediately, Nadon’s selection provoked great speculation 
and, even, concern. First, the Harper government has engaged in 
unprecedented and emphatic criticism of the judiciary.16 Through various 
decisions, including changing the vetting process for federally-appointed 
judges, the government has fostered the idea that it values ideology 
above other qualities.17 To some, the unusual choice of Nadon J. could be 
explained only in ideological terms. 
                                                                                                                       
12  Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, 2009 FC 405, [2010] 1 F.C.R. 34 
(F.C.). On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Khadr’s Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”] rights 
had been infringed by Canadian state agents. It declined to issue an order of mandamus, limiting itself 
instead to a declaration concerning the government’s conduct. Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 
[2010] S.C.J. No. 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, 2010 SCC 3 (S.C.C.). 
13  Interview of John Gomery (May 10, 2014) on The House, CBC Radio, online: 
<http://www.cbc.ca/player/News/Politics/Audio/ID/2455409481/>. The Prime Minister appointed 
Richard Wagner from the Quebec Court of Appeal in 2012. Wagner had only sat on that Court for eight 
months. “The Honourable Mr. Justice Richard Wagner”, Supreme Court of Canada, October 5, 2012, 
online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id=richard-wagner>. After 
Nadon J. was declared ineligible, the Prime Minister did turn to the Court of Appeal, appointing 
Clement Gascon. But, for the final Quebec replacement for outgoing Louis LeBel J., the Prime Minister 
appointed Suzanne Côté, a lawyer in private practice. The most recent appointee, Russell Brown, sat on 
the Court of Appeal for Alberta for one year. 
14  It also followed a pattern of appointing mostly men. Prior to Marc Nadon, the Harper 
government had appointed Marshall Rothstein (from a short list crafted by the previous Liberal 
government), Thomas Cromwell, Michael Moldaver, Andromache Karakatsanis and Richard Wagner. 
The complement of women on the Court dropped from four to three. After Nadon J. was declared 
ineligible, the government appointed Quebec Court of Appeal jurist Clement Gascon and, in 2014, 
lawyer Suzanne Côté. In July 2015, it announced the appointment of Russell Brown from Alberta. For a 
breakdown of the current government’s pattern of appointments with specific reference to gender as 
well as race, see Rosemary Cairns Way, “Deliberate Disregard: Judicial Appointments Under the 
Harper Government” in J. Cameron, B.L. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds. (2014) 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 43. 
15  Carissima Mathen, “SCC Appointments” October 19, 2011, Blogging for Equality, online: 
<http://www.bloggingforequality.ca/2011/10/scc-appointments.html>. 
16  See my “Choices and Controversy: Judicial Appointments in Canada” (2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 
52, at 60 [hereinafter “Mathen, ‘Judicial Appointments’”], noting how as, Leader of the Official 
Opposition, Stephen Harper accused the former Liberal Government of stacking the Court with judges 
sympathetic to the push for same-sex marriage. 
17  In 2006, the government changed the way that judicial candidates are ranked from “highly 
recommend”, “recommend” and “unable to recommend”, to simply “qualified” and “not qualified”. 
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Second, it became apparent that there might be a statutory barrier to 
the appointment. The problem concerned section 5 and, especially, 
section 6 of the Supreme Court Act which read as follows:  
5. Any person may be appointed a judge who is or has been a judge of a 
superior court of a province or a barrister or advocate of at least ten 
years standing at the bar of a province.  
..... 
6. At least three of the judges shall be appointed from among the judges 
of the Court of Appeal or of the Superior Court of the Province of 
Quebec or from among the advocates of that Province.   
And in French: 
5. Les juges sont choisis parmi les juges, actuels ou anciens, d’une 
cour supérieure provinciale et parmi les avocats inscrits pendant au 
moins dix ans au barreau d’une province.  
..... 
6. Au moins trois des juges sont choisis parmi les juges de la Cour 
d’appel ou de la Cour supérieure de la province de Québec ou parmi 
les avocats de celle-ci.18  
As Justice Fish was a section 6 appointee, his replacement would be 
under its criteria. Federal court judges had only ever been appointed to 
the Supreme Court under section 5. This included one judge, Gerald Le 
Dain, who was originally a Quebecker and had received his formative 
legal training there.19  
                                                                                                                       
This gave the government much more leeway in terms of selection. The government also added a fourth 
government representative  a member of law enforcement  and gave itself a working majority by 
denying a vote to the Judicial Appointments Committee chairperson except in the event of a tie. 
Mathen, ‘Judicial Appointments’, id., at 61. And in 2007, the Prime Minister said: 
We want to make sure we’re bringing forward the laws to make sure we crack down on 
crime, that we make our streets and communities safer …We want to make sure our 
selection of judges is in correspondence with those objectives. 
House of Commons Debates, No. 110 (February 14, 2007), at 1400. 
18  Supra, note 4. Note that s. 4 specifies that the Court shall consist of nine judges. 
19  Justice Le Dain was appointed to a seat normally reserved to the province of Ontario. (By 
tradition, three of the Court’s nine seats are allotted to Ontario appointees, and one each to the 
Maritimes, the Prairies and the province of British Columbia.) Another Ontario appointment, Louise 
Arbour, was also trained in Quebec. It should be noted, though, that at the time of their appointments 
both judges were well-settled in Ontario. 
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It should be noted that the government was aware of the issue.20 
Months before the appointment, the Minister of Justice expressed 
concern that the Supreme Court Act might be read to exclude all Federal 
Court judges.21 And, at the time that candidates were being vetted, the 
Chief Justice of Canada tried to alert the government to a “potential 
problem” with section 6.22  
The situation was so unusual that it inspired the government to solicit 
outside opinions.23 On the day of Nadon J.’s “nomination”,24 the Minister 
of Justice released a supportive memorandum written by retired Supreme 
Court Justice Ian Binnie. The government consulted another retired 
judge, Louise Charron, as well as a noted constitutional scholar, Peter 
Hogg, who reportedly reached the same conclusion.25  
                                                                                                                       
20  In his testimony before the Standing Senate Committee in Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
the Minister of Justice described the government’s thought process: 
Mr. MacKay: To be clear, we anticipated that there could be difficulty, and, hence, we sought 
the legal opinion of Mr. Justice Binnie, Peter Hogg and Madame Charron, which you are 
familiar with. But, in terms of the point in time in which this became a problem, it was not until 
the lawyer in Toronto launched his objection that we realized. We anticipated it could be a 
problem. We sought to get a legal opinion to address any suggestion around the eligibility of 
Mr. Justice Nadon, but, until the time that there was an objection filed, it was clear sailing.  
Mr. Justice Nadon could have taken his place on the court. In fact, to be correct, he could take 
his position on the court, but he has chosen voluntarily to recuse himself. That was his decision. 
That was not at the request of the federal government or of me, as Justice Minister. 
House of Commons, The Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
“Evidence” (November 27, 2013), online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/sen/committee/412/LCJC/ 
51062-e.HTM> [hereinafter “House of Commons, ‘Evidence’”]. 
21  Tobi Cohen, “Peter MacKay insists Conservatives are not moving Canada toward U.S.-
style justice”, National Post, August 17, 2013, online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/08/17/peter-
mackay-insists-conservatives-are-not-moving-canada-toward-u-s-style-justice/>. 
22  The Chief Justice became concerned when she saw that of six candidates initially proposed 
by the government, four sat on the Federal Court. Leslie MacKinnon, “Beverley McLachlin, PMO give 
duelling statements on Nadon appointment fight”, CBC News, May 1, 2014, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/ 
news/politics/beverley-mclachlin-pmo-give-duelling-statements-on-nadon-appointment-fight-
1.2628563>. 
23  Citing privilege, the government has refused to confirm or release any internal memoranda 
it received from lawyers in the Department of Justice. As my colleague Adam Dodek has noted, it 
strains credulity to think that the government would not have sought such advice. While impossible to 
prove, it is plausible that outside opinions were resorted to because the government received initial 
advice from its own lawyers that a Federal Court judge would be ineligible. 
24  I place scare quotes around the word “nomination” because in no meaningful sense did this 
describe the situation. The terminology of a “candidate” who has been “nominated” by the Prime Minister 
came into vogue during the preceding decade when Supreme Court candidates started to appear before 
Parliamentarians to answer questions. But, as acknowledged by a previous Liberal Minister of Justice, MPs 
did not “approve” the selection. Mathen, ‘Judicial Appointments’, supra, note 16, at 62. 
25  Only Mr. Justice Ian Binnie’s advice has been publicly disclosed. Access to information 
requests by Members of Parliament shed some but not much light on these external opinions. Results of 
such inquiries are on file with author. 
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The statutory basis for Nadon J.’s appointment was barely mentioned 
in his Parliamentary hearing.26 He was sworn in as a puisne justice on 
October 7, 2013. The next day, a Toronto lawyer filed an application in 
Federal Court challenging the appointment. The government of Quebec 
publicly supported the challenge. Justice Nadon immediately announced 
that he would delay taking up his new duties.27 The Court followed with 
a statement that, until the matter was resolved, it would have no contact 
with him.28 
The final factor contributing to the perfect storm was procedural. On 
October 22, 2013, the government introduced two new clauses to a 
pending budget bill: 
471. The Supreme Court Act is amended by adding the following after 
section 5: 
5.1 For greater certainty, for the purpose of section 5, a person 
may be appointed a judge if, at any time, they were a barrister or 
advocate of at least 10 years standing at the bar of a province.  
472. The Act is amended by adding the following after section 6: 
6.1 For greater certainty, for the purpose of section 6, a judge is 
from among the advocates of the Province of Quebec if, at any 
time, they were an advocate of at least 10 years standing at the bar 
of that Province.29 
                                                                                                                       
26  Government of Canada, Department of Justice, Ad Hoc Committee on the Appointment of 
Supreme Court of Canada Justices, Minutes October 2, 2013, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/ 
news-nouv/ja-nj/2013/doc_32972.html>. 
27  See online: <http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/11/03/supreme_court_ quarantines_ 
marc_nadon_until_challenge_heard.html#>. 
28  A few weeks later, the Supreme Court announced that it would have no contact with Nadon J. 
until the legal proceedings were concluded. In a letter issued on November 1, 2013, the Deputy 
Registrar of the Court stated: 
As questions concerning the legality of Justice Nadon’s appointment are pending before the 
Court, it has adopted the following measures to ensure that justice is both done and is seen 
to be done in an independent and impartial manner: 
1.  Justice Nadon will not have contact with the members of the Court. 
2.  Justice Nadon will continue not to participate in the work of the Court. 
3.  Justice Nadon will not occupy his office or attend at the Court. 
The Court confirms that none of its members has discussed the merits of the challenge or the 
Reference with Justice Nadon. 
See online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/case-dossier/info/dock-regi-eng.aspx?cas=35586>. See also 
<http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2013/11/03/supreme_court_quarantines_marc_nadon_until_chal
lenge_heard.html>. 
29  Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, supra, note 2. 
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Clauses 471 and 472 were meant to be declaratory. Rather than 
amending sections 5 and 6 outright, the clauses would function as a 
guide to their interpretation. Because declaratory legislation is 
retroactive,30 sections 5 and 6 would be read as having always permitted 
the appointment of any person who had been a member of the relevant 
provincial bar for 10 years. The federal government could thus deny that 
it was changing the rules to retroactively facilitate Nadon J.’s appointment. 
As well, by focusing on the criterion of bar membership the federal 
government could avoid a potentially thornier question about the eligibility 
of federal court judges per se. Clauses 471 and 472 received Royal 
Assent on December 12, 2013.31 
The declaratory legislation would seem to have resolved the issue. 
Yet, on the very day that it introduced clauses 471 and 472, the 
government put to the Supreme Court the following questions: 
1.  Can a person who was, at any time, an advocate of at least 10 years standing 
at the Barreau du Québec be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada as a 
member of the Supreme Court from Quebec pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of 
the Supreme Court Act? 
2.  Can Parliament enact legislation that requires that a person be or has 
previously been a barrister or advocate of at least 10 years standing at the 
bar of a province as a condition of appointment as a judge of the Supreme 
Court of Canada or enact the annexed declaratory provisions as set out in 
clauses 471 and 472 of the Bill entitled Economic Action Plan 2013  
Act, No. 2? 
Never before had the government sought to pass declaratory legislation 
and pursue a reference on the same issue.32  
                                                                                                                       
30  Régie des rentes du Québec v. Canada Bread Company Ltd., [2013] S.C.J. No. 46, [2013] 3 
S.C.R. 125, 2013 SCC 46, at para. 48 (S.C.C.). 
31  Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, supra, note 2. 
32  Adam Dodek has noted that the last time any government had introduced legislation at the 
same time as it sought an opinion about its validity was the Reference re: Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), 
[1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 (S.C.C.). That example, though, did not 
involve declaratory legislation. Appearing before the House of Commons Standing Committee on 
Justice and Human Rights, Dodek testified that the dual-track strategy was untenable. He expressed 
concern over the fact that the Attorney General, by permitting clauses 471 and 472 to be inserted into 
the budget bill, had implicitly vouched for its validity at the same time as asking the Supreme Court for 
an opinion on that validity. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights 
(November 19, 2013), at 0850. In my own testimony before the same Committee, I suggested that the 
unusual circumstances might well persuade the Court to refuse to answer one or both of the questions. 
Id., at 0845. 
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Why would the Executive do that? The matter was raised with the 
Minister of Justice:  
Mr. Sean Casey: My question for you is whether you would be 
amenable to delaying the impact of [clauses 471 and 472] to allow the 
Supreme Court to speak unimpeded. 
Hon. Peter MacKay: Not at all. Absolutely not. Our intention is to 
clarify what we believe is the case and what we believe the Supreme 
Court will affirm.  
Mr. Sean Casey: So as I understand what you just said to me, you are 
not in favour of delaying the implementation until the Supreme Court 
has spoken. You want to have Parliament amend the legislation to say 
that this is the state of the law, and then ask the Supreme Court what 
the state of the law is. Do I have that right? 
Hon. Peter MacKay: Well, Mr. Casey, you’ve been here a little while 
now, and you recognize that there is something called the supremacy of 
Parliament when it comes to the passing of laws. So yes, that’s exactly 
what I’m saying. We are telling the Supreme Court this is what the 
legislation means. We’re putting in place a declaratory provision to 
bring about a greater understanding of the eligibility rules, and at the 
same time we have sought an opinion from the Supreme Court. That's 
how it works, sir.  
Mr. Sean Casey: So we’re going to ask them and tell them at the 
same time. 
Hon. Peter MacKay: You got it.33 
The Minister’s reply  that the dual-track strategy was pursued for 
“clarity”  is puzzling. Declaratory legislation, which is directed at courts, 
provides all the clarity that could be required. Asking a court for its opinion 
on legislation that has already been subject to the declaratory power is, at the 
very least, redundant. Perhaps the government was caught off guard by the 
speed at which events unfolded. Declaratory legislation would be attractive 
to a government eager to constrain a court’s interpretative powers. Yet, the 
government no doubt appreciated the symbolic and political importance of 
getting the Supreme Court’s imprimatur. I suspect, too, that the government 
did not seriously consider that the Court would rule that the appointment 
was barred by section 6 in any event. It likely assumed the Reference would 
be a pro forma affair. If so, it badly miscalculated. 
                                                                                                                       
33  House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights (November 21, 
2013), at 0920. See also House of Commons, “Evidence”, supra, note 20. 
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III. THREE DILEMMAS 
The Reference was heard on January 15, 2014. In addition to the 
federal government, the Court heard submissions from the Attorneys 
General of Ontario and Quebec; three former Federal Court judges 
intervening in their own names;34 the Association of Provincial Court 
Judges; the Toronto lawyer (Rocco Galati) who had first challenged the 
appointment; and the non-profit Constitutional Rights Centre. A rather 
dry affair, the hearing belied the high drama lurking just underneath. Part 
of that drama has been explained in Part II. Once the focus shifted to the 
hearing, the Court confronted three additional dilemmas.  
The first involved the panel. One of the sitting judges, Marshall 
Rothstein, had himself been appointed to the Court from the Federal 
Court of Appeal (in his case, under section 5). When seeking leave to 
intervene, Rocco Galati asked that Rothstein J. not determine the motion. 
Justice Rothstein instead announced his recusal from the entire proceeding. 
As is the usual practice, he provided no reasons. 
Without reasons, it is impossible to know what motivated  
Rothstein J.’s decision. But, most likely, it rested on the fact that both the 
questions and the declaratory legislation referred to section 5 and section 6.35 
It was theoretically possible for the Court to conclude that neither section 5 
nor section 6 permitted the appointment of a Federal Court judge, as 
Rothstein J. had once been.36 Given the uncertainty,37 Rothstein J.’s recusal 
was appropriate.  
To the extent that there was a possibility (albeit a remote one) that 
the proceeding could throw his own appointment into doubt, Rothstein J. 
was wise to remove himself. But it is important to distinguish that fairly 
narrow issue from a quite different conflict: the fact that Rothstein J. 
hailed from the same court as Nadon J. The argument for recusal in that 
case would rest on the allegation that, having previously served on the 
same court, Rothstein J. would reasonably be perceived as having a 
natural sympathy with it and, by inference, Nadon J. himself. In other 
                                                                                                                       
34  The former justices were Robert Décary, Alice Desjardins and Gilles Létourneau. 
35  Most likely, this was intentional, as it is more difficult to argue that Federal Court judges are 
ineligible to sit on the Supreme Court per se. 
36  Plaxton & Mathen, supra, note 2. Note, though, that we did not strongly press this 
interpretation. 
37  Doubt could arise despite the fact that the reference opinion would be advisory only: 
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, 2007 SCC 79, at para. 70 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Same-Sex Marriage”]. 
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words, regardless of whether the section 5 issue was in play, it would be 
inappropriate for Rothstein J. to participate.  
The notion of bias reflected in the above argument is deeply 
problematic. If sustained, it would support challenges based on all kinds 
of past associations such as educational affiliation, or professional 
memberships.38 It would be only a few steps away from a demand for 
recusal based on racial, religious or ethnic identity or sympathy.  
The Supreme Court considered the broader issue in a 2015 decision, 
Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon 
(Attorney General).39 Writing for the Court, Abella J. noted: 
While I fully acknowledge the importance of judges avoiding 
affiliations with certain organizations, such as advocacy or political 
groups, judges should not be required to immunize themselves from 
participation in community service where there is little likelihood of 
potential conflicts of interest….  
..... 
Membership in an association affiliated with the interests of a particular 
race, nationality, religion, or language is not, without more, a basis for 
concluding that a perception of bias can reasonably be said to arise. We 
expect a degree of mature judgment on the part of an informed public 
which recognizes that not everything a judge does or joins 
predetermines how he or she will judge a case. Canada has devoted a 
great deal of effort to creating a more diverse bench. That very 
diversity should not operate as a presumption that a judge’s identity 
closes the judicial mind.40 
Justice Abella’s remarks strike the correct balance. Judges are not, 
nor should they be expected to be, blank slates. Past experience and 
connections deepen their humanity; and can justify recusal only in the 
rarest cases. While Rothstein J.’s recusal was proper, it is unfortunate 
that it was unaccompanied by any reasons that could have articulated the 
basis for it and, ideally, limited its future applicability. 
Another dilemma posed by the Reference is that it forced the Court 
to sit in judgment of one of its own. Justice Nadon’s peers had to advise 
                                                                                                                       
38  St. Lewis v. Rancourt, [2012] O.J. No. 5698, 2012 ONSC 6768 (S.C.J.). 
39  [2015] S.C.J. No. 25, 2015 SCC 25 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Yukon”]. 
40  Id., at paras. 59, 61. Note that in the Yukon case, the Court concluded that the high bar for 
demonstrating bias had been made out, but on the basis of the judge’s conduct and demeanour during 
the proceedings. The fact that he had been involved in a philanthropic organization dedicated to the 
general issue  minority language rights  before him did not suffice. 
172 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
whether he could remain one of them.41 Unquestionably, this made for a 
very difficult dynamic. Some have suggested that the Court did not go 
far enough to emphasize that it was considering only the appointment 
and not the jurist.42 The majority opinion has even been criticized for 
repeatedly describing Nadon J. as “supernumerary” — to some, this was 
a slight against him.43  
The above criticisms illustrate the depth of the controversy, but are 
unfounded. The Court’s sparing references to Nadon J.’s supernumerary 
status were for the purpose of setting out the facts for the record, and 
clarifying the result of its opinion.44 In the past, the Court has 
occasionally taken pains to declare itself neutral with respect to an 
underlying controversy.45 But the Reference was not a case where this 
kind of manoeuvre would have been effective. The Reference was not 
just controversial. It had the potential to shake the very foundations of 
the Court.46 The Court was in a “lose-lose” situation, with little it could 
do or say to mitigate the tension.  
                                                                                                                       
41  As the issue concerned eligibility, it is perhaps more accurate to speak of whether he was 
entitled to have been appointed. But the Reference dealt with his privilege to continue to sit on the Court. 
42  See the panel entitled “The Political and Constitutional Place of the Supreme Court of 
Canada” at the May 2014 conference at the University of Ottawa on CPAC Public Record, online: 
<http://www.cpac.ca/en/digital-archives/?search=appointing+supreme+court+judges>. The closest that 
the majority comes is in this statement: 
These questions arise in the context of the appointment under s. 6 of the Honourable Marc 
Nadon, a supernumerary judge of the Federal Court of Appeal and formerly, but not at the 
time of this appointment, a member of the Quebec bar of more than 10 years standing. 
Justice Nadon was not a judge of the Court of Appeal or the Superior Court of the Province 
of Quebec and therefore was not eligible for appointment on that basis. The narrow question 
is thus whether he was eligible for appointment because he had previously been a member 
of the Quebec bar. 
In my view, which I offered during the above panel discussion, the term “the narrow question” operated 
as a (very muted) signal for a more blunt statement such as “We of course take no issue on the 
suitability of Justice Nadon.” Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 3. 
43  See discussion at the panel, id. The majority opinion uses the term three times, all in the first 
nine paragraphs. 
44  The three references are found in para. 3, a purely introductory passage; para. 6 where the 
Court gives notice of its declaration and presumably wishes to clarify that Nadon J.’s status as a 
supernumerary justice of the Federal Court of Appeal is restored; and para. 9 which falls under the 
heading called “Background”. 
45  See, e.g., Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, 
2015 SCC 5, at para. 79 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”]; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2013] 
S.C.J. No. 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, 2013 SCC 72, at paras. 81-88 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bedford”]. 
46  There was a simmering suspicion in some quarters that the Court was already set against 
Nadon J. Following the opinion’s release, members of the Conservative Party of Canada caucus 
accused the Chief Justice of “lobbying” against Nadon J. and the Prime Minister’s Office intimated that 
she had tried to meddle in the appointment. John Ivison, “Tories incensed with Supreme Court as some 
allege Chief Justice lobbied against Marc Nadon appointment”, National Post, May 1, 2014, online: 
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The final dilemma is that the Reference held profound implications 
for the Court as an institution. In this respect, it was not unique. In many 
cases, the Court may be perceived as having a special interest. For 
example, its constitutional status may be invoked; or the issue may affect 
the judges personally (e.g., compensation).47 The Reference is one such 
matter. Once the Court determined that Nadon J. was not eligible, it had 
to consider the effect of the declaratory legislation purporting to state 
that he was. Ultimately, the Court had to rule on whether its own 
composition and essential features are protected against ordinary 
legislative change. 
As with the interpretative question regarding section 6, the issue had 
never been addressed. The Supreme Court Act was enacted, and amended 
numerous times, as ordinary federal law.48 While the amending formula 
in Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 does mention the Supreme Court, 
the rest of the Constitution does not. That ambiguity had led some 
scholars to suggest that Part V’s mention of the Court was aspirational 
and would take effect only in the event of a subsequent decision to 
entrench the Court in the written text of the Constitution.49  
The Supreme Court rejected that argument.50 It found that Part V was 
but one signal that the Court had already become an entrenched, 
constitutionally protected actor. Therefore, to the extent that the Supreme 
Court Act defines aspects of the Court’s composition or essential 
features, it may now be changed only through formal constitutional 
amendment.  
In our system, the Supreme Court has a duty to interpret and apply 
constitutional norms. As a constitutional actor, its own status and powers 
may well arise for determination. Decisions of this kind are open to 
criticism,51 which tends to be more pointed. But as the primary 
                                                                                                                       
<http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-politics/tories-incensed-with-supreme-court-as-
some-allege-chief-justice-lobbied-against-marc-nadon-appointment>. 
47  Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, 
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (S.C.C.). 
48  Supreme and Exchequer Court Act, S.C. 1875, c. 11, s. 4; and subsequent legislation. 
49  This has been referred to as the “empty vessels” theory and one of its proponents includes 
Peter Hogg in his Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2007), at 
4-21 cited in Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 1, at para. 97. 
50  Justice Moldaver did not take express issue with this part of the majority’s decision, though 
he disagreed somewhat on the relevant formula that would apply to specific changes. Supra, note 1, at 
paras. 113-114. I think therefore that the analysis is fairly attributed to “the Court”. 
51  Examples include: the recognition of constitutional conventions Re Resolution to amend the 
Constitution, [1981] S.C.J. No. 58, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (S.C.C.); the judicial role in identifying 
principles of fundamental justice Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, 
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interpreter of the Constitution, the Court is afforded no escape hatch. 
Indeed, to the extent that the system depends on the Court’s 
independence and authority, it would be inappropriate for the Court to 
weigh, as a factor, whether its decision in a particular case could be 
perceived as self-aggrandizing. The declaratory legislation raised clear 
constitutional questions that required resolution. They required the Court 
to delve into a self-referential exercise that was awkward, but 
unavoidable. The fact that the decision was necessarily self-regarding 
does not count as a mark against it, or against the Court. 
IV. ABSURDITY? UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES? A REJOINDER 
1. Section 6: The Restrictive Reading  
The core of the Nadon controversy was whether, under section 6 of 
the Supreme Court Act, a person who is neither a judge on a superior 
court in Quebec nor a current member of its bar is eligible for 
appointment. Though the statute mentions both judges and advocates, the 
dispute focussed on the second term which is defined by bar membership. 
In his memorandum, Binnie J. stressed that section 6 must be read in 
conjunction with section 5. He concluded that since section 5 cannot be 
read as requiring current bar membership, neither can section 6.52 At first 
blush, that conclusion may appear reasonable. To the casual observer, it 
is probably not evident why a Federal Court jurist would be ineligible for 
appointment under either section.  
In a 2013 article, Professor Michael Plaxton and I agreed with Binnie J.’s 
analysis of section 5 but parted company with him on section 6.53 Section 5 
exists to guarantee minimum legal expertise for the Court as a whole.  
                                                                                                                       
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536 (S.C.C.); and the reliance upon what are essentially separation 
of powers concerns to refuse to answer reference questions Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra, 
note 37. 
52  Memorandum from the Honourable Ian Binnie September 9, 2013, online: 
<http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/20130930_Binnie_cp.pdf>, at 5 [hereinafter “Binnie Memorandum”]. The 
French version of s. 5 reads: “Les juges sont choisis parmi les juges, actuels ou anciens, d’une cour 
supérieure provincial et parmi les avocats inscits pendant au moins dix ans au barreau d’une province.” 
The word “inscrits”, Binnie acknowledged, “could be interpreted to mean current membership”. He 
found, though, that the English version “clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly]” allows someone to be 
nominated so long as he or she “has been … a barrister or advocate of at least ten years standing”. He 
further remarked that “[i]f Parliament had intended to specify current membership it could easily have 
said so in both official languages.” 
53  Plaxton & Mathen, supra, note 2. 
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But section 6, we argued, has different functions. One is to guarantee 
expertise with respect to Quebec’s legal traditions. Another is to assure 
the province in a deeper sense of the legitimacy of such appointees.54 
This renders section 6 more restrictive than section 5.  
It should be noted that the word “restrictive” here merely notes the 
comparative size of the candidate pools produced by different readings of 
section 6. I mention this because, in various settings, it has been put to 
me that the “restrictive” reading pulls against the maxim that statutory 
interpretation must be “large and liberal”.55 On such an account, 
“restrictive” is not merely adjectival but normatively deficient: a reading 
of section 6 that creates a smaller pool of candidates eligible for 
appointment is per se undesirable. But, as this section hopefully makes 
clear, in matters of statutory interpretation desirability itself depends on 
the relevant interpretative factors.  
The first interpretative factor56 is textual. As the majority noted, 
section 5 creates four groups eligible to be appointed: current and former 
members of a superior court, and current and former barrister/advocates 
of at least 10 years standing. On its face, section 6 includes only two of 
those groups: current judges and current advocates.57 Accepting the 
maxim that “the mention of one or more things of a particular class 
excludes, by implication, all other members of the class”, the 
specification that three judges shall be appointed “from among” the 
advocates of the bar “impliedly excludes former members”.58 
                                                                                                                       
54  Our conclusions in this regard were buttressed by the relevant debates in Hansard; by 
commentary by legal historians; and by consistent and distinctive wording in s. 6 that is not found in  
s. 5. For the full analysis, see Plaxton & Mathen, supra, note 2. 
55  Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.), citing 
Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11. 
56  The majority opinion mentions three factors (which it called “premises”), two of which are 
canvassed here. The third premise was the broader scheme of the Supreme Court Act, in particular, the 
fact the Federal Court judges are excluded from those provisions enabling the appointment of ad hoc 
judges to fulfil the quorum demands for s. 6 jurists. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 1, at 
paras. 63-68. 
57  Section 5 refers to both present and former membership in the listed institutions by using the 
words “is or has been” in the English version and “actuels ou anciens” in the French version. By 
contrast, s. 6 refers only to the pool of individuals who are presently members of the bar (“shall be 
appointed from among” and “sont choisis parmi”). The significance of this change is made clear by the 
plain meaning of the words used: the words “from among the judges” and “parmi les juges” do not 
mean “from among the former judges” and “parmi les anciens juges”, and the words “from among the 
advocates” and “parmi les avocats” do not mean “from among the former advocates” and “parmi les 
anciens avocats”. Id., at para. 41. 
58  Id., at para. 42. 
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The second factor was legislative purpose. As I have argued, the 
purpose of section 6 is not confined to ensuring competence in Quebec’s 
civil law tradition. It also reflects “the historical compromise that led to 
the creation of the Supreme Court”.59 Section 6 “protects both the 
functioning and the legitimacy of the Supreme Court as a general court of 
appeal for Canada”.60 The majority found that this additional purpose, 
amply demonstrated by the historical record, required candidates who 
were not only “qualified to represent Quebec on the Court, but … were 
perceived by Quebecers as being so qualified”.61 While “excluding 
former advocates of at least 10 years standing [might not] perfectly 
advance this two-fold objective”,62 it did advance the provision’s purpose 
sufficiently so as to explain the textual differences between sections 5 
and 6. The majority took pains to emphasize that, read in this way, the 
statute implied nothing about the actual expertise in civil law of Quebec 
lawyers who are appointed to the Federal Court. It simply meant that 
such jurists are ineligible under section 6.63  
In our article, Michael Plaxton and I did not consider any constitutional 
arguments. We stated that, if the government found section 6 to be too 
narrow, it should amend it. The Reference foreclosed that option, because 
the majority concluded that the declaratory legislation64 indirectly amended 
section 6 in a manner contrary to the Constitution Act, 1982.  
As a result, the majority declared Nadon J.’s appointment void  
ab initio.65 This was a dramatic result, unprecedented and unexpected by 
almost everyone (including me). Describing itself as “genuinely 
surprised”, the federal government strongly criticized the opinion.66 It 
                                                                                                                       
59  Id., at para. 48. 
60  Id., at para. 49 (emphasis in original). 
61  Id., at para. 56 (emphasis added). 
62  Id., at para. 57. 
63  The third reason given by the majority for its restrictive interpretation was the broader scheme of 
the Supreme Court Act, in particular, the fact the Federal Court judges are excluded from those provisions 
enabling the appointment of ad hoc judges to fulfil the quorum demands for s. 6 jurists. Id., at paras. 63-68. 
64  The Court was obliged to consider the issue because the government had passed 
declaratory legislation affecting the interpretation of ss. 5 and 6. The legislation could have that 
effect only if it was intra vires Parliament. While Moldaver J.’s answer to Question 1 made it 
unnecessary for him to consider the declaratory legislation, he agreed that changes to the Court’s 
composition would require formal amendment, though he disagreed somewhat on the relevant 
formula. Supra, note 1, at paras. 114-115. 
65  Note that by making this kind of declaration, the Court appeared to issue an actual remedy, 
which would exceed the ordinary restrictions of the advisory function. 
66  Jordan Press, “Harper government ‘genuinely surprised’ by Supreme Court’s decision to reject 
Marc Nadon”, National Post, March 21, 2014, online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/ 
canadian-politics/marc-nadon-not-allowed-to-sit-on-supreme-court-of-canada-top-court-rules>. 
(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) SUPREME COURT ACT REFERENCE 177 
was not alone. Some of the criticism devolved into outright attacks on 
the Chief Justice.67 Other claims were more substantive. With respect to 
the section 6 issue, those claims tended to fall into two camps, which I 
call the argument from absurdity and the argument from unintended and 
undesirable consequences.68 Both will now be considered.69 
2.  Argument(s) from Absurdity 
The basis of the argument from absurdity is that the majority’s 
interpretation leads to such wildly counter-intuitive results that 
Parliament could not possibly have intended it as the correct reading. 
What those results are, vary. One is found in the Binnie Memorandum: 
Parliament’s obvious concern in ss. 5 and 6 was to exclude from 
consideration men and women who lack the appropriate skills and 
experience. Exclusion from possible appointment of the talent pool of 
Federal Court judges conflicts with this purpose. Take for example a 
lawyer who practices for 15 years in Montreal from 1970 to 1985, then 
sits as a Judge on the Federal Court of Appeal from 1986 to 2000. Such 
an individual is clearly better qualified in 2000 after 14 years on the 
bench than he was in 1985 prior to the initial appointment. Yet the 
objection to the appointment of Federal Court judges attributes to 
Parliament the view that Federal Court experience is a detriment not an 
asset. … Any interpretation of ss. 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court of 
Canada Act that leads to such an absurd result should be rejected.  
In the above variation, the purported absurdity arises from the exclusion 
of people who are clearly competent to perform the task of a “Quebec 
judge” on the Supreme Court. The point is: a Quebec-trained jurist who 
happens to sit on a court outside of that province is not thereby less 
competent to represent Quebec. That is a reasonable proposition. But, in 
order for it to render the restrictive reading absurd, one must also accept 
that section 6 was crafted to ensure that all competent persons would be 
considered. In fact, that does not properly describe section 5 or section 6. 
Quite the contrary: the provisions set out predictable criteria to limit the 
pool of candidates beyond mere competence. 
Think of it this way. Were “excellence in civil law” the true threshold 
for section 6, there would be no reason to confine its candidates to those 
                                                                                                                       
67  Discussed, infra, at note 92 and surrounding text. 
68  This second critique might also be described as “the sky is falling” argument. 
69  As stated earlier, I will not address substantive criticism of the Part V analysis. 
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who are or have ever been advocates in Quebec. Being a Quebec 
advocate does not exhaust the universe of those who possess relevant 
expertise in civil law. Bar admission provides, at most, a proxy for 
competence. Similarly, were “excellence in the law generally” the true 
threshold for section 5, there would be no reason to limit its candidates to 
those with 10 years bar membership. Again, length of time functions as a 
proxy for rather than sole indicator of excellence.  
So, many persons who could fulfil the functional role of a Supreme 
Court judge are excluded by a plain reading of both sections. Without 
evidence that the legislature intended to create the broadest possible 
pool, the mere fact of such exclusion cannot show that the restrictive 
reading of section 6 (or, for that matter, section 5) is absurd. 
Another argument from absurdity rests on the so-called “one-day” 
rule. Under this version, the restrictive reading would require simply that 
a candidate join the Quebec bar for one day. In its most extreme form, 
the one-day argument treats section 6 as a stand-alone provision. Since 
section 6 mentions no minimum period of bar membership, any Quebec 
advocate may be appointed to the Supreme Court on the first day that she 
is called to the bar. In my opinion, the majority correctly concluded that 
sections 5 and 6 function together, but section 6 operates more 
restrictively with respect to the criteria that it enumerates.70 There is no 
plausible reason to read section 6 as permitting a markedly reduced bar 
membership period for Quebec judges than section 5 does for all other 
judges  except, perhaps, to bootstrap a conclusion that section 6 should 
not be read on its face. But, once it is accepted that sections 5 and 6 work 
together, it is plain that section 6 does not exhaust the eligibility criteria 
for Quebec judges. 
A less extreme version of the one-day argument is that, in light of 
why currency is important, it is absurd that a person with 10 years past 
membership could be considered qualified merely by rejoining the bar 
for a single day.71 In his dissent, Moldaver J. emphasized this point: 
My colleagues have chosen not to address … whether one day’s 
renewed membership at the Quebec bar is sufficient to qualify as an 
advocate or whether something more is needed - six months, two years, 
five years, or perhaps even a continuous 10-year period immediately 
preceding the appointment.  
                                                                                                                       
70  Id., at para. 42. 
71  I will leave aside whether such an “administrative” act would be as simple as its advocates 
suggest. 
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In my view, currency means exactly that. A former Quebec superior 
court judge or advocate of 10 years standing at the Quebec bar could 
rejoin that bar for a day and thereby regain his or her eligibility for 
appointment to this Court. In my view, this exposes the hollowness of 
the currency requirement. Surely nothing is accomplished by what is 
essentially an administrative act. Any interpretation of s. 6 that requires 
a former advocate of at least 10 years standing at the Quebec bar, or a 
former judge of the Quebec Court of Appeal or Superior Court, to 
rejoin the Quebec bar for a day in order to be eligible for appointment 
to this Court makes no practical sense. Respectfully, I find it difficult to 
believe that the people of Quebec would somehow have more 
confidence in this candidate on Friday than they had on Thursday.72 
The majority declined to address the question, noting somewhat acidly 
that it had not been posed.73 
Professor Plaxton and I have conceded that such a person would 
indeed be eligible.74 If section 6 exists to provide predictable rules for 
Quebec candidates, we have said, then so long as the 10-year membership 
has been achieved, it matters only that the membership is current at the 
time of appointment to the Court.75  
It has always puzzled me that the above interpretation of section 6 
could be labelled “absurd”. Rules, after all, function in different ways. At 
their margins, rules may permit applications that do not fully match their 
underlying reason  that permit, in effect, a kind of sharp practice.  
A familiar example is tax law, where a person takes advantage of a 
loophole. It may nevertheless be consistent with purposive interpretation 
to err on the side of a more mechanical application, and tolerate the sharp 
practice.  
The premise behind the second version of the one-day argument is 
that, to the extent the restrictive reading of section 6 permits a Prime 
Minister to evade it by use of an “administrative act” (as Moldaver J. 
called it), the reading is fatally deficient. But the argument blurs an 
important distinction between a rule, and the actors charged with 
respecting it. Most assuredly, it would be odd, perhaps even improper, 
                                                                                                                       
72  Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 152-153. 
73  Id., at para. 71. 
74  Plaxton & Mathen, supra, note 2, at 21. 
75  Now, I do not agree that a single day’s bar membership is enough for a former judge of a 
Quebec superior court. The reality is that such a person is likely to have 10 years bar membership 
anyway, because that is the minimum qualification for superior court judges in Canada. But, for a 
hypothetical candidate who did not, I would not read s. 6 as permitting the appointment of such a person 
after joining the Quebec bar for one day. 
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for a Prime Minister to encourage a past advocate to join a law society 
for a single day in order to ascend to the Supreme Court. But the 
potential for a rule to be manipulated by a devious or indifferent actor 
shows, at most, that the rule may be ineffective or under-inclusive. It 
does not render that rule absurd.  
The final argument that I group under the “absurdity” umbrella 
(although it could also qualify as one about unintended consequences) is 
that the restrictive reading of section 6 imputes to Parliament a negative, 
even derogatory, attitude towards the Federal Court. Recall what Binnie J. 
wrote: “the objection to the appointment of Federal Court judges 
attributes to Parliament the view that Federal Court experience is a 
detriment not an asset.”76  
Now, such a view might well be uninformed.77 But, this hardly 
establishes that Parliament is thereby foreclosed from holding it. To be 
clear, I take no position on the issue other than to note that one may not 
legitimately disregard statutory language or history to avoid an 
uncomfortable conclusion. The same argument was made with respect to 
provincial court judges. Both sections 5 and 6 enumerate “superior” 
courts, leaving judges of inferior ones without a direct route to the Court 
(under section 5, they could be appointed as past advocates). Yet there 
were vanishingly few supporters pressing for the express inclusion of 
provincial court judges. And, there appears to be far less concern at the 
fact that they remain ineligible.78 
If the above response seems harsh, there is a much softer one: the 
restrictive reading of section 6 does not imply a negative assessment of 
those whom it excludes.79 Professor Plaxton and I noted that rules 
occasionally function as heuristic devices, achieving an underlying goal 
indirectly rather than directly.80 Here, the rule limits a candidate pool to 
those thought to possess the required competence and legitimacy. Like a 
voting age rule that bypasses the need to individually assess citizens for 
                                                                                                                       
76  Binnie Memorandum, supra, note 52. 
77  During a Q and A session following a presentation I made at the Canadian Constitution 
Foundation Conference in January 2015, an audience member offered a spirited argument that, by 
nature of its limited jurisdiction, the Federal Court is in fact not the equivalent of superior courts. In the 
volatile atmosphere following the Reference, people have been extremely reluctant to articulate this 
view. My point is that it is, plainly, not absurd. 
78  Provincial court judges did intervene in the Reference to make a similar eligibility argument, 
but there was very little discussion of, or concern raised about, their position. 
79  The majority opinion echoes this argument, supra, note 1, at para. 60. 
80  Plaxton & Mathen, supra, note 2, at 22. 
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sufficient maturity, the currency rule avoids having to individually assess 
particular candidates for their link to Quebec society. 
So the arguments from absurdity ignore one legislative reading in favour 
of another that supports what some clearly see as a better outcome. 
Certainly, requiring section 6 appointees to be current members of the bar is 
not the only way to ensure that the Court’s Quebec judges are sufficiently 
connected to that province. It may not even be a particularly good or 
comprehensive way. The argument is, simply, that it is the method most 
plausibly suggested by all of the relevant interpretative factors.  
3.  Consequences 
The second broad criticism is that the Court’s interpretation of 
section 6 has led to unintended, and highly undesirable, consequences. 
Some have charged that Quebec is being cheated of the fullest 
complement of potential judges.81 The argument has been even more 
impassioned regarding the Federal Court, which is described as 
denigrated and its judges rendered second-class citizens.82 The Minister 
of Justice went so far as to suggest that the restrictive interpretation 
might be “discriminatory”.83 Concern also has been expressed that 
Quebec lawyers will be dissuaded from sitting on the Federal Court, 
leading to a precipitous decline in that bench’s quality.84  
The argument that Quebec is not getting the benefit of the fullest 
complement of candidates may be valid. But similar concerns are present 
for all of the limiting rules. And, unlike the 10-year rule, the currency 
requirement applies only to appointments under section 6. An 
outstanding Quebecker who meets the relevant criteria could be 
appointed under section 5. She or he could follow the path of a Arbour J. 
or Le Dain J.85 I do not suggest that either of those judges was appointed 
under section 5 in order to evade the strictures of section 6. Nor do  
                                                                                                                       
81  Laura Payton, “Peter MacKay won’t rule out renaming Marc Nadon to Supreme Court”, 
CBC News, March 24, 2014, online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/peter-mackay-won-t-rule-out-
renaming-marc-nadon-to-supreme-court-1.2584517>. 
82  See the extraordinary speech made by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court: Cristin 
Schmitz, “Chief Justice Noel’s remarks spark debate over how far to go”, The Lawyers Weekly, 
December 26, 2014, online: <http://www.lawyersweekly-digital.com/lawyersweekly/3432?pg=3#pg3> 
[hereinafter “Schmitz”]. 
83  House of Commons, ‘Evidence’, supra, note 20, at 0935. 
84  A Conservative Member of Parliament put that argument to me during my testimony before 
the House of Commons Standing Committee on November 21, 2013. Supra, note 33, at 0945. 
85  Supra, note 19 and surrounding text. 
182 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
I deny the likely political consequences of appointing a judge from 
Quebec under section 5 when the province already enjoys three of the 
Court’s nine seats. I merely note that an alternate route exists.  
Finally, it has been suggested that people will refuse appointments 
to the Federal Court in order to maintain their eligibility for the 
Supreme Court, harming the former’s quality.86 The argument is utterly 
speculative. Appointments to the Supreme Court are generational, 
featuring innumerable considerations. The chances that a single 
individual will receive a Supreme Court nod are akin to winning the 
lottery. It must also be said that there is something disconcerting in the 
idea that potential jurists would be seriously affected by such 
considerations. Self-interest is a powerful motivator. But the suggestion 
that an unidentified, indeed unidentifiable, group might be dissuaded 
from joining the Federal Court is not a sensible argument for reading 
section 6 of the Supreme Court Act to include them. In fact, very little 
is known about who actually applies to the Federal Courts. The 
government has not made such statistics available.87 But it seems 
plausible that a variety of factors would weigh on the decision to apply; 
and that the position’s independence, security of tenure and generous 
compensation would hold plenty of attraction for entirely competent 
candidates even if accepting that position now forecloses a direct 
promotion to the Supreme Court.  
Reasonable people can disagree about whether section 6 included or 
excluded someone like Nadon J. Reasonable people can also disagree on 
the underlying policy of ensuring legitimacy, and not just technical 
competence, when filling the three Quebec seats. Some, though, have 
insisted that the only reasonable interpretation is that Nadon J. was 
always eligible. This resistance to alternative arguments, and the 
accompanying characterization of them as “absurd”, suggests that we are 
no longer really dealing in interpretation but in passionate advocacy in 
favour of what the law should say. But the focus needs to be foremost on 
what the law does say. (Perhaps ironically, Nadon J. endorsed this 
approach at his Parliamentary hearing.88) 
                                                                                                                       
86  Supra, note 84. See also comments by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, supra, note 82. 
87  Kirk Makin, “Of 100 new federally appointed judges, 98 are white, Globe finds”, The Globe 
and Mail, April 17, 2012, online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/of-100-new-
federally-appointed-judges-98-are-white-globe-finds/article4101504/>. 
88  Supra, note 26. 
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V. EASY CASES AND THEIR ANSWERS 
The Reference was an exceptional moment for the Court. The 
foregoing sections reveal its exceptional character in respect of history, 
procedure and substance. Here, I focus on another element: the 
Reference’s reception.  
Reaction to any Supreme Court decision is apt to occupy a spectrum. 
For a given case, some will think the Court got it mostly right, and some 
mostly wrong. Some will think the Court completely mistaken and others 
will not care. It is impossible to place the reaction to the Reference along 
a continuum of outrage. So, the discussion that follows is admittedly 
impressionistic. I acknowledge, too, that my own small role in the 
Reference may have coloured my perceptions.  
The Supreme Court routinely considers highly controversial issues.89 
And those decisions provoke spirited reaction.90 Even so, the reaction to the 
Reference struck me as unusual. Though it obeyed the letter of the ruling, the 
government clearly considered its spirit to be utterly misguided. Ministers 
continued to defend their interpretation of section 6, relying on the 
dissenting opinion as well as prior endorsements by former justices and 
eminent scholars.91 Some government members went so far as to impugn the 
Chief Justice herself, sparking concern both in Canada and abroad.92 In over 
                                                                                                                       
89  See, in the past two terms alone: Carter and Bedford, supra, note 45; Reference re Senate 
Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, 2014 SCC 32 (S.C.C.); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British 
Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.); R. v. Nur, [2015] S.C.J. 
No. 15, 2015 SCC 15 (S.C.C.). 
90  Grant Huscroft, “The Supreme Court should leave assisted suicide to Parliament”, The 
Toronto Star, October 10, 2014, online: <http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2014/10/10/ 
supreme_court_should_leave_assisted_suicide_to_parliament.html>; Tristan Hopper, “Peter MacKay 
slams Supreme Court for quashing mandatory minimum gun sentences”, National Post, April 22, 2015. 
91  The Prime Minister’s office made the following comment: 
This legal advice was reviewed and supported by another former Supreme Court justice as 
well as a leading constitutional scholar, and was made public. None of these legal experts 
saw any merit in the position eventually taken by the Court. 
Mark Kennedy, “Harper refused ‘inappropriate’ call from chief justice of Supreme Court 
on Nadon appointment, PMO says”, National Post, May 1, 2014, online: <http://news.nationalpost. 
com/news/canada/canadian-politics/harper-refused-inappropriate-call-from-chief-justice-of-supreme-
court-on-nadon-appointment-pmo-says> [hereinafter “Kennedy”]. Additionally, former Justice Michel 
Bastarache testified, with me, before the Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs on November 21, 2013. Justice Bastarache opined that both ss. 5 and 6 included past 
advocates. 
92  John Ivison, “Tories incensed with Supreme Court as some allege Chief Justice lobbied 
against Marc Nadon appointment”, National Post, May 1, 2014, online: <http://news.nationalpost. 
com/news/canada/canadian-politics/tories-incensed-with-supreme-court-as-some-allege-chief-justice- 
lobbied-against-marc-nadon-appointment>. It was eventually revealed that, while the Chief Justice did 
raise concerns about how s. 6 would bear on the appointment of a federal court judge (after the 
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two decades of involvement in Supreme Court advocacy, I have rarely seen 
such levels of executive hostility towards a decision.  
Public commentary on the ruling was more mixed.93 But criticism 
emerged from unusual sources including former Supreme Court 
justices94 and the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Appeal.95 At a 
conference that I co-organized in May 2014, most of the participants 
(scholars and jurists) expressed concern about at least one aspect of the 
Reference.96 In short, the Reference left many persons unconvinced that it 
was the “right answer”.97 And, the quality of that disagreement appeared 
unusually sharp. Why? In this final section, I discuss three possible 
reasons: internal division; finality; and expectations in an “easy” case. 
1.  Internal Division 
In previous work, I have strongly defended the utility of dissent.98 
Dissent can function, inter alia, as a pressure valve, and a necessary 
                                                                                                                       
government’s short list revealed that four of six candidates were from that bench) she did so when the 
selection process was still formative, and long before Nadon was selected: Kennedy, id.; Julius 
Melnitzer, “ACTL weighs in on Harper-McLachlin spat”, Financial Post, May 8, 2014, online: 
<http://business. financialpost.com/legal-post/actl-weighs-in-on-harper-mclachlin-spat>. 
93  Grant Huscroft, “The Supreme Court’s faulty logic on Nadon”, National Post, March 25, 2014, 
online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/grant-huscroft-the-supreme-courts-faulty-logic-on-
nadon>; Andrew Coyne, “Flaky Supreme Court ruling meets dubious appointment”, National Post,  
March 24, 2014, online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/andrew-coyne-on-marc-nadon-flaky-
supreme-court-ruling-meets-dubious-appointment> [hereinafter “Coyne”]; Leonid Sirota, “What You Wish 
For”, March 22, 2014, online: <https://doubleaspectblog.wordpress.com/2014/03/22/what-you-wish-for/>. 
More positive commentary included Paul Daly quoted in Sean Fine, “Supreme Court’s rejection of Nadon 
is a legal marker and a political blow”, The Globe and Mail, March 21, 2014, online: 
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/supreme-courts-rejection-of-nadon-is-a-legal-marker-
and-a-political-blow/article17625541/>; Adam Dodek quoted in John Geddes, <http://www.macleans. ca/ 
politics/ottawa/q-a-supreme-court-of-canadas-rejects-a-harper-appointment/>; Carissima Mathen, “Nadon 
ruling hits like an earthquake”, Ottawa Citizen, March 21, 2014, A8. 
94  See the comments by former Justice John Major in Sean Fine, “Harper says he will ‘respect’ 
Supreme Court’s blocking of Nadon”, The Globe and Mail, March 25, 2014. 
95  Schmitz, supra, note 82. 
96  “Appointing Supreme Court Judges in the 21st Century: Reflections on the Nadon 
Reference”, University of Ottawa, May 28, 2014. 
97  I borrow this term from legal theory, but this section is not intended to enter into that debate. 
For a very brief survey, see: H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); 
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Joseph Raz, 
“Authority and Justification” (1985) 14 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3; John Mackie, “The Third Theory 
of Law” reprinted in Marshall Cohen, ed., Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London: 
Duckworth, 1984); Brian Bix, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
98  See my “The Upside of Dissent in Equality Jurisprudence” in B.L. Berger, J. Cameron &  
S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2012 (2013) 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 111; see also my “Dissent and 
Judicial Authority in Charter Cases” (2003) 52 U.N.B.L.J. 321. 
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condition for a vibrant jurisprudence. A healthy legal order requires the 
freedom to disagree. So, I am reluctant to criticize any dissent as such. But 
dissent does not come without cost. And in this case, the cost was high.  
A 6-1 split would not normally be considered significant. But in the 
exceptional context of the Reference, the dissent carried disproportionate 
weight. For one, it lent credence to the view that the majority had evaded 
such issues as the “one-day” argument.99 I doubt that Moldaver J. meant 
to suggest that the majority had acted in bad faith. But some of his 
comments could lend support to that view.100 Additionally, the dissent 
did not really stand alone. It vindicated previous opinions by persons 
who might be considered of equivalent stature to the Court: former 
justices, and the most prominent constitutional scholar in the country.101  
So, notwithstanding the general value of dissenting opinions, a 
unanimous opinion likely would have garnered a different reception.  
A unanimous opinion would have conveyed the deepest possible 
authority, and permitted the Court to speak as an institution rather than as 
individual judges. The Court could have issued it per curiam, or as a 
joint opinion signed by every judge. A joint opinion is a very blunt 
message, only delivered in the context of a serious power struggle or 
challenge to a court’s authority. (The paradigmatic example is the United 
States Supreme Court’s joint opinion in the de-segregation case of 
Cooper v. Aaron.102)  
So the Court likely would have issued a unanimous opinion per 
curiam.103 Because of the dissent, in order to signal a truly joint 
endeavour the six participating judges were required to sign it in turn. 
The image of the seriatim names may well have contributed to a sense 
that they were kicking Nadon J. off the Court in the face of a lonely, 
principled objector. In such a politicized case, every detail matters. 
                                                                                                                       
99  Supra, note 72 and surrounding text. 
100  Supreme Court Act Reference, supra, note 1, at paras. 123-124 where Moldaver J. implies 
that the majority engages in “cherry-picking” and resorts to statutory interpretation principles 
“heretofore unknown”; Coyne, supra, note 93. 
101  Supra, notes 25 and 92 and surrounding text. 
102  358 U.S. 1 (1958). In its even more famous predecessor, Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the unanimous opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren. 
103  See, e.g., Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 
(S.C.C.) or Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra, note 37. 
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2. Finality 
The next possible reason is finality. Of course, all Supreme Court 
rulings are “final”. Most obviously, they conclude the concrete dispute 
between the parties and may not be further appealed.104 A ruling also 
becomes a powerful precedent. In these respects, the Reference 
resembles other cases. But in at least two ways, the finality attending the 
Reference was subtly different.  
First, the Reference imposed a degree of finality that was probably 
unexpected. The original interpretative question concerned ordinary 
legislation. Even if the existing framework presented an obstacle to 
Nadon J.’s appointment, the government appeared to have a relatively 
straightforward option: amend the statute.105  
The declaratory legislation changed that. The Court was asked not 
only to interpret sections 5 and 6, but about the scope of Parliament’s 
authority to set the terms for that interpretation. Once the Court 
determined that Nadon J. was ineligible, Question 2 forced the Court into 
the morass of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982.106  
As discussed earlier, the Court concluded that it has evolved from a 
creature of statute to a constitutionally entrenched actor; and that its 
composition may not be changed through ordinary means. In one fell 
swoop, the Quebec Rule changed from a mere curiosity to a 
constitutional dictate. This could be perceived as a move by the Court to 
insulate section 6 from subsequent meddling. And, if one were to find the 
majority’s answer to Question 2 overbroad that could foster suspicion of 
the answer to Question 1.  
The Reference also concerned an issue (constitutional amendment) 
that may well be subject to a more powerful degree of finality. Any 
                                                                                                                       
104  There are always exceptions. First, in a non-constitutional case, declaratory legislation 
permits the government to change the outcome, and is presumptively retroactive. Second, in the case of 
an existing statute, the government may resort to amendment, or even repeal, and may do so retroactively. 
Third, if the subject matter is subject to the Charter’s notwithstanding clause, the law may be preserved 
despite an adverse ruling (note, though, that it may not be applied retroactively: Ford v. Quebec (Attorney 
General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.)). And, in the most extreme cases, a 
constitutional ruling may be changed by formal amendment (with prospective effect only). 
105  Of course, there would still be the question of what to do with Nadon J. himself, as in the 
normal course such changes would not have retroactive effect. 
106  Prior to the Court’s release of the opinion, I mused that one way out of the thicket would be 
if the Court decided Question 1 in the government’s favour, and declined to answer Question 2. 
Conversely, I acknowledge that even in a reference dealing solely with the Supreme Court Act, it is 
possible that broader constitutional questions would have arisen. But, without a reference question 
clearly requiring such analysis it is quite possible that the Court would decline to answer such questions 
on the basis it would be premature to do so. 
(2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) SUPREME COURT ACT REFERENCE 187 
constitutional pronouncement is treated as final. Yet, the Court retains 
the power to depart from it. And, over the years, the Court has articulated 
numerous reasons that can justify that sort of departure.107  
While it is theoretically possible that the Court will articulate reasons 
to justify eventually departing from rulings about the amending formula, 
the prospect is unlikely. In terms of constitutional design, amendment 
rules represent the most direct expression of a society’s political will. 
Arguably, they are also the most tied to expectations of predictability. In 
other words, if anything in the constitutional firmament is entitled to a 
powerful presumption of stability, and against change, amendment rules 
would seem to be it. If so, then the Court’s decision regarding Part V has, 
for all practical purposes, rendered the Reference “untouchable”. To  
the extent that one might have misgivings about the substance of the 
decision, those misgivings would no doubt be heightened by the 
attendant degree of finality. 
3. Expectations in ‘Easy’ Cases 
A court of final appeal performs at least two functions. It provides 
illumination when the legal path is unclear. And it provides authoritative 
settlement for disputes. Illumination may be considered particularly 
important when a case is “hard”, for example, when it presents roughly 
balanced arguments, high stakes and an inchoate legal framework.108  
A hard case may provide just as much pressure for authoritative 
settlement. But in hard cases especially, we look to courts for the right 
answer. Conversely, if a case is considered to be easy with an obvious 
resolution, the court’s involvement is more likely to be sought for its 
settlement function.109  
It is clear that many perceived the Reference to be an easy case. On 
policy grounds, there seemed no good reason to exclude Federal Court 
judges. The reference was initiated after Nadon J. (who was clearly 
competent) had been sworn in. And the Court was reviewing the exercise 
                                                                                                                       
107  Carter, supra, note 45; Bedford, supra, note 45; R. v. Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 
2 S.C.R. 833 (S.C.C.). 
108  John Gardner, “Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps” (1988) 8(3) Oxford J. of Legal 
Studies 457. 
109  See, for example, legal process theory: Henry M. Hart Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal 
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law, William N. Eskridge & Philip P. 
Frickey, eds. (Westbury, NY: Foundation Press, 1994). Note that Hart and Sacks do qualify the 
principle of “institutional settlement” with the term “duly established procedures”, suggesting that a 
bare outcome is insufficient. Op. cit., at 4. 
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of a highly discretionary executive power. That the Court would actually 
reject Nadon J. was unthinkable. 
To find that Nadon J. was eligible under section 6 would have been 
the path of least resistance. It would leave the Court whole; it was 
consistent with the tradition of maximum executive discretion; and it 
removed the need to deal with the declaratory legislation. That the Court 
did not opt for that path, in a case that many people also saw (for 
whatever reason) as presenting an easy interpretive issue, seemed to 
provoke a suspicion among commentators that the Court had approached 
the case with the wrong attitude. Adding to this sense was the fact that 
the Court decided that its own status and accompanying composition 
rules are entrenched in the Constitution, taking the matter out of the 
government’s hands. 
I dispute the notion that the Reference was, even initially, an easy 
case. Section 6 of the Supreme Court Act presented an issue of first 
impression in a highly volatile and uncertain context. It was dependent 
upon interpretative factors that were not obvious. Once those factors are 
accepted, the answer to the question became easier, but unquestionably 
hard to mete out.110  
If one perceived the Reference as an easy issue with an obvious (and 
easy) answer, the fact that the majority opted for the harder answer could 
be seen as proof of (a) misguided reasoning or (b) bad faith. In this 
article, I have tried to show why the first characterization is unfounded. 
The second, I contend, is unfair. Answers are not owed respect merely 
because they are hard. But, sometimes, choosing the hard answer will 
signal a level of engagement and commitment that is entitled to respect 
(which, I hasten to add, does not require substantive agreement). To put 
it another way, it is entirely possible that, like many others, the judges 
who comprised the majority opinion initially thought that the Reference 
was an easy case with an obvious answer. But the deliberative space 
provided by the reference procedure (clear questions; submissions by 
interested parties; opportunity to test premises in an oral hearing; 
requirement of collective discussion) persuaded them of the soundness of 
the more difficult answer.  
                                                                                                                       
110  That the answer was hard, though, could not justify judicial avoidance. Naturally, there are 
exceptions, for example, if the answer will lead to a breakdown of the rule of law: Reference re: 
Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] S.C.J. No. 36, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (S.C.C.). But these are very rare. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has emerged as the 
most significant actor in Canada’s constitutional order. Its path has often 
been a fraught one. The Court wields immense powers. Robust debate 
over the limits of judicial review is likely to continue for as long as the 
Court occupies its current role. All the more striking, then, that one of its 
most politicized moments should occur in a dispute, initially, over a 
minor issue of statutory interpretation.  
For what it revealed about core institutional relationships, what it 
decided in terms of the Court’s constitutional status and what it required 
of the eight justices on the bench in 2013-2014, the Supreme Court Act 
Reference was an exceptional moment. At its core was the answer 
provided about the Court’s absent ninth justice. It was a hard answer: 
difficult, perhaps unwelcome and, in some ways, brutal. It would not 
have been cause for celebration to anyone on the Court. But that very 
difficulty should count for, and not against, the judges who felt 
compelled to render it.  
 
